The adoption of Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) applications in the real world remains limited, even nearly 50 years after the introduction of HE. This is particularly unfortunate given the strong privacy and confidentiality guarantees these tools can offer to modern digital life. While attempting to incorporate a simple straw-man PSI protocol into a web service for matching individuals based on their profiles, we encountered several shortcomings in current outsourcing frameworks. Existing outsourced protocols either require clients to perform tasks beyond merely contributing their inputs or rely on a non-collusion assumption between a server and a client, which appears implausible in standard web service scenarios. To address these issues, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first general construction for non-interactive outsourced computation based on black-box homomorphic encryption. This approach relies on a non-collusion assumption between two dedicated servers, which we consider more realistic in a web-service setting. Furthermore, we provide a proof of our construction within the Universal Composability (UC) framework, assuming semi-honest (i.e., passive) adversaries. Unlike general one-sided two-party SFE protocols, our construction addi-tionally requires sender privacy. Specifically, the sender must contribute its inputs solely in encrypted form. This ensures stronger privacy guar-antees and broadens the applicability of the protocol. Overall, the range of applications for our construction includes all one-sided two-party sender-private SFE protocols as well as server-based arithmetic computations on encrypted inputs. Finally, we demonstrate the practical applicability of our general outsourced computation frame-work by applying it to the specific use case of Outsourced Private Set Intersection (OPSI) in a real-world scenario, accompanied by a detailed evaluation of its efficiency.
Zur Publikation